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The security of real-world quantum key distribution (QKD) critically depends on the number
of data points the system can collect in a fixed time interval. To date, state-of-the-art finite-
key security analyses require block lengths in the order of 104 bits to obtain positive secret keys.
This requirement, however, can be very difficult to achieve in practice, especially in the case of
entanglement-based satellite QKD systems, where the overall channel loss can go up to 70 dB or
more. Here, we provide an improved finite-key security analysis which can reduce the block length
requirement by 14% to 17% for standard channel and protocol settings. In practical terms, this
reduction could save entanglement-based satellite QKD weeks of measurement time and resources,
thereby bringing space-based QKD technology closer to reality. As an application, we use the
improved analysis to show that the recently reported Micius QKD satellite is capable of generating
positive secret keys with a 10−5 security level.
Introduction.—Quantum key distribution (QKD) is ar-
guably the most mature quantum technology today with
full-stack systems already being deployed in real-world
networks [1–4]. In the research community, the secu-
rity of real-world QKD systems remains a central pro-
gramme and much effort have been devoted to under-
standing the security of side-channels and systems with
finite resources. Of particular importance is the non-
asymptotic security of QKD—a theoretical programme
that analyzes the security of finite-length keys and the
security errors of parameter estimation, error correction,
and privacy amplification [5].
In fact, the need for finite-key security was recognized
long ago [6–8], but it is only in the recent decade that
security proof techniques became more accessible. On
this note, we refer to those based on entropic uncertainty
relations [9], which are known to be pretty efficient in
terms of the block length [10, 11]. Here, block length is
defined as the size of the sifted measurement data before
parameter estimation; i.e., m = n+k, where n is the raw
key length and k is the number of bits used for parameter
estimation. Previously, one would typically need m >
105 to get a positive secret key [8]. Now, using the proof
techniques based on entropic uncertainty relations, the
block length requirement can be reduced to m > 104,
which gives an order of magnitude of saving [10, 11].
For QKD systems deployed in standard optical net-
works, one can readily obtain their finite-key security
since the measurement data size of these systems is typ-
ically large enough [4]. However, for QKD systems de-
ployed in challenging environments such as space [12–15],
obtaining their finite-key security can be an issue. In par-
ticular, owning to high channel loss and environmental
challenges, these systems might not gather enough mea-
surement data in short-time intervals. To overcome this
issue, one can either spend more time to gather data (the
simplest solution) or upgrade the QKD system’s trans-
mitter and receiver to achieve faster data collection rates.
These solutions are straightforward for terrestrial-based
QKD systems, but the same cannot be said for space-
based QKD systems. More specifically, the latter can
only communicate with the ground stations over very pre-
cise time windows (essentially only over good passes) and
upgrading in space may not be realistic with current tech-
nology [16]. These limitations hence suggest that space-
based QKD is a major scientific challenge. This is espe-
cially the case for entanglement-based satellite QKD (EB
S-QKD), which is known to be slower than its prepare-
and-measure counterpart but offers the attractive possi-
bility of untrusted node operation.
Very recently, it has been reported that the finite-key
security of EB S-QKD has been demonstrated for the
first time using an improved Micius QKD satellite [15].
There, the authors reported a positive key with a se-
curity parameter of 10−10 based on the security proof
technique of Ref [10]. However, the analysis there did
not consider the cost of parameter estimation and hence
the random sampling bound was not properly applied.
As a result, this led to overly-optimistic secret key rates.
Using their experimental data (m ∼ 103) and the meth-
ods from Refs. [10, 11], we found that one would actually
require a larger security parameter of 10−5 in order to
generate a positive key (see below).
In view of the above, it is thus timely to develop new
proof techniques that would further sharpen the finite-
key security of QKD systems with small block lengths,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
04
88
2v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
10
 Se
p 2
02
0
2particularly those with block lengths m ∼ 103 to 104. To
that end, we present here an improved finite-key analysis
which can further reduce the block length requirement
by 14% to 17%. While the improvement is not dramatic
(in the sense by several orders of magnitude), it could al-
ready save EB S-QKD many weeks of data collection and
resources. Our main theoretical contribution is a new
random sampling bound (without replacement), which
improves pretty significantly the statistical accuracy of
the parameter estimation procedure in the small block
length regime. The inequality is presented in Lemma 2
and may be of independent interest to other problems.
Using this refined analysis, we show that the improved
Micius QKD system [15] is capable of generating positive
keys with 10−6 security; with the same level of security,
no positive keys were found (numerically) with the anal-
ysis from Ref. [11].
Entanglement-based QKD.—In order to formally
present our results, let us first introduce the BBM92
QKD protocol [17] in consideration. We assume that the
QKD users, Alice and Bob, are given a 2m-partite quan-
tum state ρAB , which is derived from a larger (2m+ 1)-
partite quantum system ABE. Here, the quantum sys-
tem E is controlled by an adversary, Eve, who is compu-
tationally unbounded. We consider a protocol in which
the basis choice is uniform and the raw key is randomly
sampled from both bases [11]. This protocol is essentially
the same as the BBM92 QKD protocol analyzed by Shor
and Preskill [18] except that less than half of the sifted
data will be used for parameter estimation (via random
sampling): n bits for the raw key and k = m − n bits
for parameter estimation. Importantly, in sampling from
both bases, the errors will be uniformly distributed (and
hence symmetrized) between the raw key pair and the
random sample used for parameter estimation. This al-
lows us to view the parameter estimation step as a stan-
dard random sampling problem, where the goal is to in-
fer the error rate of the raw key pair using the error rate
observed in the random sample (drawn without replace-
ment).
The protocol is characterized by the block length, m,
and three key distillation subroutines, i.e., parameter
estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification,
which we denote by pe, ec, and pa, respectively. The pa-
rameter estimation subroutine is parameterized by two
numbers: pe = {k, δ}, where k ≤ m is some positive
integer and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) is the tolerated error rate. The
error correction and privacy amplification subroutines are
parameterized by two positive integers and one positive
integer, respectively: ec = {t, r} and pa = {`}. The
QKD protocol is described in Protocol. I (with only the
details needed to illustrate the main technical results; for
a more rigorous description, see Ref. [11]).
Security analysis.—Following standard QKD security
definition [19, 20], a QKD protocol is said to be εqkd-
secure if it is ε1-correct and ε2-secret, where 0 < ε1+ε2 ≤
Settings: m, pe = {k, δ}, ec = {t, r} and pa = {`}
1. Measurement. Alice and Bob agree on a random binary
string Φ ∈ {0, 1}m over an authenticated public channel
and measure their respective quantum signals using this
string. They then agree on a random sample (drawn without
replacement) of size k from the entire measurement data set
and store them into two pairs of strings: (X,V ) for Alice and
(Y,W ) for Bob. Here, X and Y are random strings taking
values in {0, 1}n; thus V and W take values in {0, 1}k. Note
that m = n+ k.
2. Parameter estimation using random sampling. Alice
publicly sends V to Bob, who then computes the error rate
between V and W , i.e., Zpe := |V ⊕W |/k. If the error rate
exceeds the tolerated error rate δ, they abort the protocol.
Otherwise, they proceed to the next step. This decision is
stored in a binary-valued flag Fpe ∈ {X,∅}, where X means
successful and ∅ means abort.
3. Error correction. Alice sends Bob a syndrome T of
length r which is computed from her raw key X. Then Bob
generates an estimate of Alice’s raw key, X ′, from Y and T .
To verify that the correction is successful, Alice computes
a hash H(X) (of length t) of X and sends it to Bob, who
then compares it with his hash H(X ′). If the hash values are
different (i.e., H(X) 6= H(X ′)), they abort the protocol; this
decision is stored in Fec ∈ {X,∅}.
4. Privacy Amplification. Alice and Bob perform random-
ness extraction based on two-universal hashing to extract an
identical secret key pair, SA and SB , each of length `, from
X and X ′, respectively.
Protocol I. BBM92 QKD with random sampling as adapted
from Ref. [11].
εqkd. The security parameter of the protocol is thus εqkd.
The correctness criterion captures the maximum proba-
bility that Alice’s and Bob’s output keys are different,
and the secrecy criterion looks at how distinguishable
Alice’s output key is from the ideal output key (i.e., one
that is uniformly distributed and independent of Eve’s
side-information E and all classical messages sent over
the public channel). Importantly, this choice of secu-
rity definition guarantees that the protocol is universally
composable [19–21]: the pair of secret keys can be safely
used in any cryptographic task, e.g., for encrypting mes-
sages, that requires a perfectly secret key.
With the definitions and relevant tools in place we are
now ready to analyze the finite-key security of Proto-
col. I. The question which we would like to address here
is the following: What is the maximum value of `, the
output secret key length, for a desired choice of secu-
rity parameter εqkd and protocol settings? To answer
this question, we first have to identify the mathematical
conditions for which the protocol is εqkd-secure. These
conditions (for the considered BBM92 QKD protocol) are
given in Ref. [11, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3], which we
3restate in a concise form below:
Theorem 1 (Adapted from Ref. [11]). For the QKD pro-
tocol described above with fixed settings, it is εqkd-secure
if there exists ν ∈ (0, 1/2− δ] satisfying
2−t + 2εpe(ν) + εpa(ν) ≤ εqkd, (1)
where the error functions due to privacy amplification
and parameter estimation are defined as
εpa(ν) :=
1
2
√
2−n[1−h2(δ+ν)]+r+t+`,
εpe(ν) := exp
(
− nk
2ν2
m(k + 1)
)
,
respectively, and with h2(x) := −x log x− (1− x) log(1−
x), the binary entropy function.
To illustrate the physical meaning (and importance) of
ν, we first recall the parameter estimation step. There,
Alice and Bob have to check if Zpe := |V ⊕W |/k ≤ δ. If
it is true, they proceed to the next step; otherwise they
abort the protocol. The whole point of this exercise is
to ensure that Zkey := |X ⊕ Y |/n is very close to δ with
very high probability. More formally, what we want is
an exponential tail bound on the following event: Zpe ≤
δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν. This describes the bad event that the
parameter estimation step is successful (i.e., Fpe = X)
and that the error rate of the raw key pair exceeds δ by
some constant positive term ν. In Refs. [10, 11], it has
been shown that the probability of this event, Ppe :=
Pr
[
Zpe ≤ δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν
]
, is upper bounded by
Ppe ≤ exp
(
− 2nk
2ν2
m(k + 1)
)
= εpe(ν)
2, (2)
which is based on Serfling’s seminal work in probabil-
ity inequalities for random sampling without replace-
ment [22, Corollary 1.1].
As one can see from the above, the deviation term ν
plays an important role in maximizing `: a smaller devia-
tion term ν means a larger secret key. However, ν cannot
be arbitrarily small—this would make εpe(ν) very large
(which in turn is constrained by the security parameter,
εqkd). Evidently, there is a delicate interplay between
these error functions and it would pay off very well here
if we can further sharpen Eq. (2). In the following, we
present a new random sampling probability bound for
parameter estimation, which may be of independent in-
terest to other problems as well.
Lemma 2 (New sampling bound). Let Zkey and Zpe
be defined as above. Then for any ν > ξ > 0 such that
m(δ + ξ) ∈ Z+,
Ppe ≤ exp
(
−2mkξ
2
n+ 1
)
+ exp
(−2Γm(δ+ξ)((nν′)2 − 1)),
(3)
where ν′ := ν − ξ and
Γm(δ+ξ) :=
1
m(δ + ξ) + 1
+
1
m−m(δ + ξ) + 1 .
Proof. To start with, let Zblk =
∑m
i=1 Zi be the total
number of errors in the initial block of length m and
Zblk = Zblk/m be the average error. Note that in QKD
this information about the total error is not known to the
users; we are modeling it here only for technical reasons.
With this, we can write Pr
[
Zpe ≤ δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν
]
as
a sum of Pr
[
Zpe ≤ δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk ≥ Zpe + ξ
]
and Pr
[
Zpe ≤ δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk < Zpe + ξ
]
for
some ξ > 0. The first term can be upper bounded using
Pr
[
Zpe ≤ δ ∩ Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk ≥ Zpe + ξ
]
≤ Pr [Zblk ≥ Zpe + ξ] ≤ exp(−2mkξ2
n+ 1
)
,
where the second inequality is implied from Ref [22,
Corollary 1.1] (lower tail instead of upper tail).
For the second term, we have that Pr[Zpe ≤ δ∩Zkey ≥
δ+ ν ∩Zblk < Zpe + ξ] ≤ Pr[Zkey ≥ δ+ ν ∩Zblk < δ+ ξ]
as the latter event is implied from the former event, and
Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk < δ + ξ] ≤ Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩
Zblk < dm(δ + ξ)e] = Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk < merr],
where merr := dm(δ + ξ)e. Generally, we may assume
merr = m(δ + ξ), i.e., δ + ξ is chosen such that m(δ + ξ)
is a positive integer.
The above can be further written as Pr[Zkey ≥ δ +
ν ∩ Zblk < merr] ≤
∑merr
t=0 Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν ∩ Zblk =
t] =
∑merr
t=0 Pr[Zblk = t] Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν|Zblk =
t]. An upper bound can be obtained by noting that∑merr
t=0 Pr[Zblk = t] Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν|Zblk = t] ≤
Pr
[
Zkey ≥ δ + ν|Zblk = merr
]
. Notice that the last term
is given by the upper tail probability of the hyperge-
ometric distribution given the total number of errors
Zblk = merr is fixed, i.e., Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν|Zblk =
merr] = Pr[Zkey ≥ merr/m + (ν − ξ)|Zblk = merr]. In
the ideal case, the exact value of the upper tail probabil-
ity can be computed (since the total number of errors is
tightly bounded now), but this may introduce numerical
inaccuracies due to the discrete nature of the distribu-
tion [23, 24]. To that end, we use instead a probability
inequality by Hush and Scovel [25], which provides pretty
tight exponential bounds for hypergeometric distribution
(at least in the settings for which we are interested in).
This inequality reads
Pr[Zkey ≥ merr/m+ (ν − ξ)|Zblk = merr]
≤ exp (−2αmerr(n2(ν − ξ)2 − 1)),
where
αmerr := max
{
1
n+ 1
+
1
k + 1
,
1
merr + 1
+
1
m−merr + 1
}
.
4Note that it is important for ν > ξ since the de-
viation term must be positive. We can in fact fur-
ther simplify the bound by picking the right-side-hand
term in αmerr , i.e., exp (−2αmerr(n2(ν − ξ)2 − 1)) ≤
exp (−2Γmerr(n2(ν − ξ)2 − 1)), where Γmerr := 1/(merr +
1) + 1/(m −merr + 1). It can be verified that Γmerr de-
creases with increasing merr and hence
Pr[Zkey ≥ δ + ν|Zblk = merr] ≤ e−2Γmerr ((nν′)2−1).
where ν′ := ν − ξ is a positive constant.
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FIG. 1. Numerically optimized finite-key rate `/m vs block
length m for s = 6, 10. In this simulation, the tolerated error
rate is set to δ = 4.55% so that the protocol is likely to succeed
with high probability. Ref. [15] reported a total error rate of
4.51% and block length m = 3100 bits. The (red) vertical
line represents the block length obtained in the experiment,
which gives a finite-key rate of 1.962× 10−3 based on εqkd =
10−6. This suggests that about 6 secret bits can be generated
in a single run of the protocol. The numerically optimized
parameters are ~xopt = {1.962× 10−3, 0.5, 0.1141, 0.0693}.
Using Lemma. 2, the error function for parameter es-
timation now reads
ε′pe(ν, ξ)
2
= exp
(
−2mkξ
2
n+ 1
)
+ exp
(−2Γm(δ+ξ)((nν′)2 − 1)).
To maximize the secret key length, `, we employ the
following program parameterized by a bounded set of
four-dimensional real vector, ~x = (α, β, ν, ξ). The block
length m, tolerated error rate δ, correctness error 2−t =
10−(s+2), and security parameter εqkd = 10−s are fixed.
max
~x∈R4
` = bαmc
s.t. 2−t + 2ε′pe(ν, ξ) + εpa(ν) ≤ εqkd,
α ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ (0, 1/2],
0 < ξ < ν < 1/2− δ,
where k = bβmc is the number of bits allocated to pa-
rameter estimation and r = 1.19h2(δ) is the expected
error correction leakage. Here, α is the secret key rate,
which is defined as the number of secret bits generated
divided by the block length, i.e., `/m. For comparison,
we also run the same optimization for Theorem. 1, which
uses Eq. (2) for parameter estimation. From Figure 1, we
observe that the new analysis outperforms the existing
analysis for both security levels, s = 6, 10: in particular,
the minimum block length m has been reduced by about
14% to 17%. However, this improvement is not enough to
obtain finite-key security for εqkd = 10
−10 as reported by
Ref. [15]; for that, we would need m > 4800 (for the new
analysis) and m > 5800 (for the one based on Eq. (2)).
We note that one can still obtain finite-key security using
Eq. (2); however the smallest security error that we can
find for a positive key is εqkd = 10
−5.
Discussion and conclusion.—In this application study,
we find that the improved Micius Satellite (arguably the
most advanced QKD technology in space) would have
to revise their security parameter from εqkd = 10
−10 to
10−6. This means that the overall security error is four
orders of magnitude bigger than reported. This revision
immediately raises the following question: Is εqkd = 10
−6
good enough for the space-based QKD? Unfortunately,
the answer to this question is not trivial and may entail
discussions beyond the scope of this work. For the start,
we emphasize that the security statement εqkd ≤ 10−6
does not lend any concrete description to how the QKD
system could have gone wrong. It is simply an upper
bound on the probability that a bad event happens [20];
note that a QKD system which produces non-identical se-
cret keys with probability 10−6 has the same security as
one that gives the entire secret key to Eve with probabil-
ity 10−6. We note that one could also use the adversary’s
guessing probability as a metric to help determine a good
value of εqkd, e.g., see Ref. [26].
Nevertheless, we argue that one can at least refer to
key streaming for some guidance. In this setting, we con-
sider the use of a QKD system to generate a continuous
stream of secret bits, where some portion of the earlier
bits are used for authentication in subsequent rounds [19].
By composability, the security of the key stream is then
εstream ≤ vεqkd, where v is the number of times the users
intend to operate the QKD system. With this, we now
have a clear connection to how many times the users can
operate the QKD system before it needs to be rebooted
with a fresh secret key. To appreciate this connection,
suppose εstream has to respect some recommended secu-
rity level, say 10−5, which is specified by some national
standards organization. Then, it is clear that for some
fixed εqkd (determined by the system parameters), the
number of times one can operate the QKD system, v,
is limited. Applying this example to the improved Mi-
cius QKD satellite, we thus have v ≤ 10, i.e., not more
than 10 rounds of QKD operation. This suggests that
5the improved Micius QKD satellite may have to be re-
booted (with a fresh secret key for authentication) after
every 10 QKD cycles, or equivalently, the generation of
60 secret bits.
In conclusion, we have presented an improved finite-
key analysis for BBM92 QKD protocol with small block
length. While the refined analysis gives pretty good im-
provements over existing methods, the problem of finite-
key security with small block length is still a pressing one.
This problem, as we have highlighted above, is especially
relevant to long-range QKD systems such as satellite-
based QKD, which will most likely form the backbone of
the future quantum internet.
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